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Abstract
Generic advertising of fluid milk and cheese represents the principal promotional activity undertaken with the $370 million per year provided
by dairy farmers and fluid milk processors. This article describes a stock-flow-feedback simulation model that includes 17 intermediate and final
dairy products, short-term and long-term milk supply response and government policies that influence the impacts of generic advertising on net
revenues for dairy farmers. Permanent increases in generic advertising expenditures increase net revenues for dairy farmers, with a cumulative net
benefit to cost ratio of 2.8. Permanent decreases produce a larger reduction in net revenues and indicate a net benefit to cost ratio larger than 4.5.
Spending a larger proportion of existing generic advertising funds on cheese rather than fluid milk would also markedly increased dairy farmer net
revenues. Generic advertising increases net revenues for dairy farmers even when industry supply response and government regulation are
accounted for.
.
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Dairy farmers pay a mandatory assessment of 15 cents per
hundred pounds of milk marketed in the continental United States
to fund a national demand expansion program. This assessment
generally ranges between 0.75 and 1% of the price farmers receive
for their milk, and most of the money supports generic advertising
of fluid milk (e.g., Got Milk?) and cheese (e.g., Behold the Power
of Cheese) products. The aims of generic milk and dairy product
advertising are to increase consumer demand for fluid milk and
dairy products, enhance dairy farm revenues, and reduce the
amount of surplus milk purchased by the government under the
Dairy Price Support Program. Legislative authority for these
assessments dates back to the Dairy Production and Stabilization
Act of 1983. More recently, fluid milk processors began their own
generic fluid milk advertising program (e.g., the Milk Mustache
print media campaign) funded by a mandatory $0.20 per hundred
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pounds processor check-off on fluid milk sales. These two
programs represent the two largest generic advertising programs
in the United States, raising $370 million per year.
Generic advertising differs from traditional branded advertis
ing in several important ways. First, although branded advertising
is an individual firm's activity, generic advertising is a collective
effort by all firms within an industry. Second, branded advertising
attempts to differentiate a firm's product from its competitors;
generic advertising is not geared at product differentiation and is
most successful for products with homogeneous characteristics
such as basic commodities. Third, the goal of generic advertising
is to increase overall demand for a commodity, whereas branded
advertising is primarily firm market share driven. A final dis
tinction is that dairy generic advertising's ultimate goal is to
increase both the quantity and price of a raw input (milk) through
shifts in the demand curve for dairy products requiring that input.
The long-run effectiveness of the program in increasing
demand and the price of milk will depend critically on the nature
of the milk supply response. For example, if the long-run supply
curve for the industry is perfectly elastic, any increase in demand
due to generic advertising will not increase price or producer
surplus. In contrast, demand increases with an upward sloping
long-run supply curve increase both price and producer surplus

under effective generic advertising. Consequently, modelers must
explicitly link supply response to demand and price increases due
to advertising to evaluate the impact of generic dairy advertising.
Because dairy is the largest generic advertising program,
numerous studies on the economic impacts of generic dairy
advertising exist (see Ferrero et al. (1996) for an annotated bib
liography). This research falls into two broad categories. The first
category of research is positive in nature, evaluating the economic
impacts of generic advertising on dairy markets. The majority of
this research indicates that generic advertising increases overall
market sales and prices at farm, wholesale and retail market levels,
and that the benefits of generic advertising substantially outweigh
the costs. Kaiser (2006) found a benefit-cost ratio of 4.32 for fluid
milk and cheese advertising by dairy farmers. The second line of
research is normative in nature, investigating optimal allocation
issues. Studies include optimal spatial allocation of advertising by
markets (Liu and Forker, 1990), allocation of advertising over
time (Vande Kamp and Kaiser, 2000), allocation of advertising
across products (Kaiser and Forker, 1993), allocation of
advertising by media type (Pritchett et al., 1998) and allocation
of expenditures by marketing and research activity (Chung and
Kaiser, 1999). All these studies use econometric methods,
optimization, or a combination of both. No previous studies of
the impacts of generic dairy advertising employ stock-flow
feedback models that include explicit balancing of dairy
component (e.g., fat, protein, lactose) to assess market impacts.
Two characteristics of US dairy markets create challenges for
researchers interested in modeling the impacts of generic dairy
advertising. First, the US dairy industry is highly regulated. Milk
pricing at the farm, dairy processor and retail levels depends on
federal and state milk marketing orders (which regulate minimum
prices that must be paid to farmers), the Dairy Price Support
Program (which provides a farm-level price floor and safety net
through government purchases of selected dairy products), and
import tariffs (which complement other price-related policies by
dramatically limiting imports of some dairy products). Properly
incorporating the impacts of these regulations on prices is es
sential for sound evaluation of generic advertising. Second, raw
milk is a commodity that has many components with different end
uses. Modeling all the possible uses for these components and the
associated component-based pricing structure of the regulated
market is a complicated process. Nearly all previous studies of
generic advertising's impacts deal with these issues through
simplifying assumptions about milk components and a high
degree of aggregation for dairy products. They therefore omit
potentially important linkages that could affect the accuracy of
predicted model outcomes (Bishop et al., 1994). These two
characteristics of the dairy market make the use of a model with
disaggregated representation of dairy products, components and
price regulations policy instruments quite appealing.
Accordingly, this paper has four objectives. The first is to
examine the dynamic market impacts of increases and decreases
in generic advertising expenditures for both fluid milk and cheese
in a multiple-product dynamic simulation model. The analysis
also allows the computation of a cumulative benefit–cost ratio
to assess the effectiveness of generic advertising in a dynamic
context. The second objective is to determine the allocation of

fluid milk and cheese expenditures that maximizes net revenues
received by dairy farmers for a given level of generic advertising
expenditures. A third objective is to demonstrate the applicability
of a systems modeling approach to the evaluation of generic
advertising. A final, broader, objective is to contribute to under
standing of how generic advertising influences product markets.
1. Model description
A causal diagram illustrates a number of the differences
between the impacts of generic and branded advertising (Fig. 1).
The diagram depicts a number of balancing (B) and reinforcing
(R) feedback processes associated with the impacts of generic
advertising. In contrast to branded advertising, the ultimate
objective of generic advertising is to increase net revenues for
input suppliers (dairy farmers in this case). The mechanism for
this is as follows. Generic advertising expenditures increase sales
of the advertised products, which decreases inventories (a phys
ical stock, depicted with a box in Fig. 1), increases their price,
increases the net margin earned from them and stimulates
additional production. Increases in production of the advertised
product increase the demand for the raw input (milk) needed as an
input. Increased raw input use for the manufacture of advertised
products (in this case, fluid milk and cheese) decreases the avail
ability of the raw input to manufacture non-advertised products
(e.g., butter, dried milk). This reduces the available supply of nonadvertised products, increasing their price. As noted above, mini
mum raw input price regulation exists in the US dairy industry;
the minimum price paid to farmers is calculated as a function of
product prices and product for which the raw input is used. An
increase in the price of non-advertised products increases the
minimum regulated price. The price increase for advertised
products also contributes to increases in the minimum regulated
price. A higher minimum regulated price increases the net rev
enues earned by raw input suppliers (the objective), but also
increases input costs for all products. The input cost increase
increases the prices of all products, which will have a dampening
effect on demand.
Fig. 1 facilitates discussion of the principal balancing and
reinforcing processes at work in the US dairy industry. The term
balancing loop (B) implies that an initial change in one of the
variables in the loop will ultimately result in pressure for that
variable to move in the direction opposite the change, all other
things being equal. In contrast, a reinforcing loop (R) indicates
than an initial change will be reinforced through the feedback
process. More formally, feedback loop polarity is SGN(φX1Output/
φX1Input) where SGN is the sign function, X Output is the value of a
variable X after one feedback cycle in response to an initial
change in the value of X Input (Sterman, 2000).
Conceptually, three feedback processes have an important
impact on the ultimate effectiveness of generic advertising to
achieve its objective of increasing input supplier net revenues
(Fig. 1). The production response loop is a typical market
response: increased profitability of advertised production results
in additional supplies, increasing inventories and reducing price
relative to what would have occurred in the absence of a pro
duction response. The second feedback process (the regulated

Fig. 1. Causal diagram of generic advertising effects in the US dairy sector.

price loop) implies that the effects of generic advertising will be
offset to a certain extent through increases in input costs for all
dairy product manufacturers through increases in the minimum
regulated price. Supply response by input suppliers (the supply
response loop) indicates that increases in the price for the raw
input supplier will increase the quantity supplied of the raw
product. This increases the availability of the raw input for use in
the manufacture of non-advertised products, decreasing those
product prices compared to what they would have been. An
important issue in the evaluation of generic advertising expen
ditures is the extent to which the production response, the mini
mum price regulation and raw input supply response feedback
processes erode the effectiveness of advertising expenditures over
time.
To evaluate the effectiveness of generic advertising in the dairy
industry context, a more detailed empirical model is necessary.
This model builds upon a previous conceptual commodity
(Sterman, 2000) and the dairy industry price determination
model in Nicholson and Fiddaman (2003). To capture the effects
of minimum price regulation, the model includes a total of 17 final
and intermediate dairy products. In most dairy-related models,
intermediate products are those dairy products used in the
manufacture of other dairy products. A common example is the
use of dried milk in cheese manufacturing. Final products are
those used by non-dairy manufacturers (e.g., other food pro
cessors) or final consumers. Perishable products such as fluid
milk, yogurt and ice cream are flow variables for which pro
duction is equal to sales. Commercial inventories of storable
commodities such as butter, cheese, dried milk and dried whey
(used in the minimum pricing formulae) are stock variables,
where production increases inventories and sales reduce them.
Increases in commercial inventories of these products result in
decreases in the prices of these products. In the dairy industry,

manufacturers separate raw milk into a variety of components
(butterfat, proteins, lactose and minerals) using various physical
processes (e.g., filtration). As a result, dairy models should
adequately represent the physical balance of these components
across different product uses. The model includes the use of skim
milk and cream components to capture component balance. Es
sentially, cream represents fat and skim milk represents protein,
lactose and minerals.
In addition to the minimum regulated pricing that operates in
the dairy industry, other key policy interventions include price
supports for selected manufactured products (butter, cheese and
dried milk) and restrictions on dairy product trade. Price
supports operate through the willingness of the Commodity
Credit Corporation (CCC; established by the federal govern
ment) to purchase dairy products at prices designed to maintain
a minimum level of milk prices paid to dairy farmers, or through
direct payments made to farmers when milk prices fall below a
target level. Dairy trade policies restrict the quantities of many
imported (storable) products, which historically has maintained
US milk and dairy product prices above those in international
markets. Although under recent market conditions these
policies have limited impact on the effectiveness of generic
advertising and are not shown in Fig. 1, the empirical model
includes them.
Supply response occurs through changes in both productivity
per unit of capital (milk production per cow per year) and changes
in the capital stock (the number of cows). Productivity responds
with a delay to changes in the price of the raw input (milk) in the
short run (complete response to a step change in the milk price
relative to a reference price occurs within about 3 months),
whereas the number of cows responds to an exponential smooth
(another delay) of relative net margins over 3 years. The number
of cows results from a biological reproduction rate (assumed to be

constant) and the rate of removal of animals from the aggregated
national herd, which depends on the profitability of milk
production. The rate of removal is the inverse of the average
animal lifetime, which is a function of current margins relative
to long-term expectations. The degree to which dairy farmers
modify average animal lifetimes in response to relative margins is
unknown, so the impacts of this parameter on simulated outcomes
are evaluated with sensitivity analysis.
The impact of generic advertising on the demand for fluid
milk and cheese is modeled as a modified multiplicativereference formulation (Sterman, 2000) as follows:
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This formulation implies that sales of advertised dairy prod
uct j at time t are a function of a sales in the 2004 reference
(base) year, product price Pj relative to reference price, and the
maximum of the effect of generic advertising expenditures
relative to their 2004 reference value or a minimum assumed
proportion, MPj, of the reference dairy product sales in the
absence of generic advertising expenditures (GAE). The
minimum proportion term is necessary to avoid zero sales in
the absence of generic advertising. The parameters ηj and γj are
elasticities of sales with respect to price and generic advertising
expenditures, respectively. Reference sales values grow over
time at proportional monthly growth rates θj due to exogenous
population and income growth. To reflect delays in the
adjustment of consumer behavior to changes in price and
generic advertising expenditures, the specification assumes
exponential smoothing with a time constant of one month.
The model is formulated as a system of nonlinear differential
equations solved by numerical integration. Parameter values for
behavioral responses to prices and inventory levels and the initial
stock values are from previous dairy industry models (Bishop and
Nicholson, 2004; Nicholson and Fiddaman, 2003), data from
the Agricultural Marketing Service of the US Department of
Agriculture (which administers the minimum pricing regula
tions), and an extensive network of industry contacts (Cornell
Program on Dairy Markets and Policy, 2006). Values of the
elasticity of fluid milk and cheese demand with respect to
advertising expenditures are from Kaiser and Dong (2006), and
are equal to 0.037 and 0.035, respectively. Values of the elasticity
of fluid milk and cheese demand with respect to price come from
Schmit and Kaiser (2004) and Bishop and Nicholson (2004) and
are equal to −0.2 and −0.5, respectively. The model simulates all
variables at monthly time intervals over the six-year period 2004
to 2009 using a small calculation interval to approximate a
continuous-time system. Model evaluation followed the process
Sterman (2000) describes. A previous version of the model
evaluated the impact of growth in dairy product demand on dairy
farmer revenues (Nicholson and Stephenson, 2006). For the
purposes of the analyses herein, underlying growth in demand
for dairy products (i.e., outward shifts in the demand curves) in

response to increases in household income and population are
exogenous, and are from Nicholson and Stephenson (2006) and
Schmit and Kaiser (2006). Although the financial resources for
generic advertising in the dairy industry derive from assessments
on dairy farmers and fluid milk processors (and thus depend on
milk production and sales of fluid milk) the allocation of funds to
generic advertising is not proportional to funds available, so
generic advertising expenditures are exogenous.
2. Model scenarios
Two rather stylized types of analyses of the dynamic market
impacts of generic advertising are the focus herein (Table 1). The
first is an analysis of permanent (i.e., step) changes in generic
advertising in the presence of growth in demand for dairy
products, and the second is an analysis of which proportional
allocation of 2004 advertising expenditures between fluid milk
and cheese maximizes cumulative discounted dairy farmer net
revenues. For each of these scenarios, the impact of two assumed
values of the long-term supply response (sensitivity of average
animal lifetime to profitability) is evaluated. For the baseline
scenarios, the value of the sensitivity of average animal lifetime in
response to relative net margins is equal to 1.0; for scenarios
termed less sensitive, the value of this parameter is 0.5. The
average animal lifetime uses a multiplicative-reference (constant
elasticity) formulation in which the average lifetime is equal to a
reference lifetime modified by the ratio of current smoothed net
margins divided by a reference net margin to the power of the
sensitivity parameter described above.
The model is initialized using the average values of product
prices, production and dairy product inventories for 2004. Base
line scenarios include 2004 levels of generic advertising ex
penditures and constant proportional growth in dairy product
demand (the θj discussed above). Step changes in generic ad
vertising occur in January 2006 and continue until December
2009. Differences between the baseline scenario and scenarios
with step changes indicate the impact of increasing or decreasing
generic advertising expenditures.

Table 1
Generic advertising scenarios analyzed
Scenario 1

Implementation

Baseline

Assumed exogenous growth rates for dairy products
and 2004 level of generic advertising expenditure;
allocations between fluid milk and cheese as in 2004
Increase generic
Increase generic advertising on both fluid milk
advertising
and cheese by 100% from 2004 levels as a
permanent (step) change beginning in January 2006
Eliminate
Eliminate generic advertising on both fluid milk and
Generic
cheese as a permanent (step) change beginning in
Advertising
January 2006
Optimal product
Determine the optimal allocations of 2004 generic
allocation of generic advertising expenditures between fluid milk and
advertising
cheese as a permanent step change beginning in
January 2006
1

For each of the scenarios, the impact of two assumed values of the long-term
supply response (sensitivity of average animal lifetime equal to 0.5 or 1.0) is
evaluated.

Fig. 2. Fluid milk sales in response to increases and decreases in generic advertising expenditures, difference from baseline.

Key outcome variables of interest are changes in product sales,
changes in selected dairy product prices, changes in dairy farmer
net revenues (monthly and cumulative revenues from milk sales
less production costs), milk production (supply response) and the
cumulative net benefit–cost ratio (CNBCR; the ratio of changes in
dairy farmer net revenues to changes in overall generic advertising
expenditures). The changes in cumulative dairy farmer net revenues and the CNBCR are calculated from January 2006, when
changes in generic advertising expenditures occur. The results of
each of the scenarios relative to the baseline indicate the impact of
the change in generic advertising amounts or allocations. Because
of the nonlinear feedback dynamics present in the system, each of

these variables is likely to vary over time. The dynamic benefit–
cost ratio of generic advertising, previously evaluated only in a
static sense for dairy generic advertising, is of particular interest.
3. Results
3.1. Impacts of step increases or decreases in generic
advertising expenditures
A permanent increase in generic fluid milk and cheese
advertising expenditures initially increases fluid milk and cheese
sales during the first few months relative to the Baseline (Fig. 2

Fig. 3. Cheese sales in response to increases and decreases in generic advertising expenditures, difference from baseline.

Fig. 4. Milk production in response to increases and decreases in generic advertising expenditures, difference from baseline.

and 3). The demand for raw milk to manufacture these products
rises more quickly than milk production (Fig. 4) due to milk
supply response delays arising from cow reproductive biology
and farm-level decision making. The availability of milk for
non-advertised products decreases and their price increases
(Fig. 5 indicates this for butter), which results in an increase in
the minimum regulated price (Fig. 6). The price of cheese
increases (Fig. 7), which also contributes to an increase in the
minimum regulated price, and cumulative producer net revenues

increase relative to the baseline (Fig. 8). Thus, the initial effects
of the increase in generic advertising expenditures have the
desired outcome of increasing producer net revenues.
Over time, however, the effectiveness of the increase in
expenditures is eroded by the balancing feedback processes. As
consumers respond to price increases brought about by
increased demand for the raw milk to make fluid milk and
cheese, a relatively small decrease in fluid milk sales from their
peak value occurs during the next 12 months (Fig. 2). A similar

Fig. 5. Butter prices in response to increases and decreases in generic advertising expenditures, by sensitivity of capital investment response, difference from baseline.

Fig. 6. Producer milk price from in response to increases and decreases in generic advertising expenditures, by sensitivity of capital investment response, difference
from baseline.

pattern of behavior is observed for cheese sales (Fig. 3), but
demand growth resumes in 2007 and continues through 2010
because the underlying growth rate for cheese sales is 1.5% per
year. Dairy producers respond with a delay to the increased
minimum regulated prices, increasing both productivity and the
capital stock (cows), which increases milk supplies. As more
milk is produced (Fig. 4) and demand for fluid milk and cheese
is dampened through the consumer response, more milk is
available for use in non-advertised products. Increased produc
tion of those products decreases their price (Fig. 5), increased
cheese production (the production response loop from Fig. 1)

decreases the cheese price (Fig. 7), and the minimum regulated
price decreases. The increase in the minimum regulated price
due to an increase in generic advertising expenditures falls from
a peak of nearly $0.60 per 100 lbs in mid-2006 to less than
$0.10 per 100 lbs by late 2008 (Fig. 6) as a result of supply
response. After January 2008 the rate of increase of the dif
ference in cumulative producer net revenues slows markedly
(Fig. 8).
Permanent elimination of generic advertising expenditures
initially reduces fluid milk and cheese sales by a larger amount
than the permanent increase raises them (Figs. 2 and 3). This

Fig. 7. Cheese prices in response to increases and decreases in generic advertising expenditures, difference from baseline.

Fig. 8. Cumulative producer revenues in response to increases and decreases in generic advertising expenditures, by sensitivity of capital investment response,
difference from baseline.

asymmetric effect arises from the use of the log-linear (constant
elasticity) formulation for the effect of advertising expenditures
in the advertised product demand equations. An initial rapid
decrease in fluid milk and cheese sales is followed by a brief
recovery, then continued decline. The initial pattern is essen
tially the inverse of that observed for price increases, and again
results from the interaction of dairy product demand, farm milk
prices and milk production. The decrease in demand for fluid
milk and cheese reduces the demand for raw milk, which
increases the milk available for the manufacture of nonadvertised products, reducing their prices (Fig. 5), the cheese
price (Fig. 7) and the minimum regulated price (Fig. 6). The
lower milk prices result in lower milk production (Fig. 4) as
dairy producers reduce productivity per cow and reduce cow
numbers. The combination of a lower milk price and reduced
quantity of production reduces cumulative producer revenues
(Fig. 8). Over time, consumers respond to lower dairy product
prices by increasing demand (Figs. 2 and 3) and the reduction in
milk production becomes large enough to result in price in
creases for non-advertised products and cheese (Figs. 5 and 7).
This increases the minimum regulated price (Fig. 6) and the rate
of decrease for the difference in cumulative producer net reve
nues slows markedly after January 2008 (Fig. 8).
An important conclusion to be drawn from these results is that
milk prices will not always be higher for the scenario with
increased generic advertising, nor lower for the scenario with
elimination of generic advertising (Fig. 6). As milk production
responds over time to initial price increases or decreases through
the supply response feedback loop, about 30 months after the
increase or decrease, farmer milk prices become higher (for the
decrease) or lower (for the increase) than they would have been
in the absence of any change in generic advertising expenditures.
This effect is also observed in dairy product markets: by 2008 the

butter price is lower and by 2009 the cheese price is lower than it
would have been in the absence of increased generic advertising.
Another important insight is that although the responsiveness of
animal average lifetime to relative margins affects the numerical
results, the patterns of behavior generally are similar for the more
and less responsive scenarios.
One principal objective of generic advertising for fluid milk
and cheese is to increase net revenues received by US dairy
farmers. The analyses suggest that even when various balancing
feedback loops are taken into account, expenditures on generic
advertising return far more net revenue to dairy farmers than the
expenditures. A permanent doubling of generic advertising ex
penditures would increase cumulative dairy farmer net revenues
by between $1.3 and $2.2 billion, but would cost only about
$485 million over the four years from 2006 to 2009 (Fig. 8).
Elimination of generic advertising expenditures would reduce
dairy farmer net revenues between $2.2 and $3.3 billion over
those 4 years, when the sensitivity of milk production to changes
in long-run margin is higher and lower, respectively.
The cumulative net benefit–cost ratio (CNBCR) at time t
during the period 2006 to 2009 is:
R 2009
S
B
t¼2006 CNRt � CNRt
CNBCRt ¼ R t¼2009
S
B
t¼2006 CGAEt �CGAEt
where CNRt represent the cumulative dairy farmer net revenues
at time t for scenarios S and the baseline B and CGAEt are the
cumulative generic advertising expenditures for the same
scenario. The CNBCR varies over time depending on develop
ments in dairy product markets (Fig. 9). However, for both
increases and decreases in generic advertising expenditures the
CNBCR grows rapidly then decreases. For a doubling of
generic advertising expenditures, the CNBCR initially increases

Fig. 9. Dynamic cumulative benefit cost ratio for increases and decreases in generic advertising expenditures, by sensitivity of capital investment response.

to 5.2 and then decreases to 2.8 by the end of simulation. The
sensitivity of dairy farmers to average animal lifetime has an
impact on the CNBCR for generic advertising expenditure
increases, with a value of 4.5 at the end of simulation when
supply is less responsive. Both estimates are somewhat lower
than past benefit–cost ratios estimated for generic dairy ad
vertising on fluid milk and cheese (e.g., 4.88 for the period 1997
to 2006 by Kaiser, 2007), probably due to better representation
of balancing feedback effects. In the absence of generic
advertising, the value of the CNBCR is larger (after the initial
increase, the value is nearly 10 rather than 5) and ending values
range from 4.5 (more sensitive) to 6.8 (less sensitive).
An alternative measure of the returns to generic advertising is
the current net benefit cost ratio (CuNBCR), which is the ratio for
the CNBCR without the integral signs. Whereas the CNBCR
indicates the average return at a given time, the current net benefit
cost ratio indicates marginal returns. The CuNBCR increases to
about 6.0 for increases in expenditures by mid-2006, then falls
below 1.0 in mid-2008. For decreases in expenditures, the initial
return increases to nearly 10.0 by mid-2006, but becomes nega
tive in mid-2008. The CuNBCR is sensitive to assumptions about
the responsiveness of the average animal lifetime to changes in
profitability, with higher values for less sensitive responsiveness.
Overall, the scenarios indicate that on average over the period
2006 to 2009, increased generic advertising expenditures on fluid
milk and cheese would increase fluid milk and cheese sales,
increase milk production, increase cumulative dairy farmer
revenues, and have a CNBCR (but not always the CuNBCR)
far larger than 1.0 (Table 2). Conversely, elimination of the
generic advertising expenditures would decrease fluid milk and
cheese sales, decrease milk production, and decrease cumulative
dairy farmer revenues. Moreover, the CNBCR of generic ad
vertising expenditures may be larger at lower expenditure levels,
as indicated by the asymmetries in response in doubling and

elimination. Thus, the analyses support the effectiveness of
generic advertising to enhance dairy farmer well-being, even in
the face of multiple feedback loops and product market effects.
3.2. Allocation of existing expenditures to maximize cumulative
dairy farmer revenues
Although the previous analyses address overall effectiveness
of generic advertising expenditures, another relevant question is
whether those expenditures have the largest possible effective
ness, that is, that generates the largest cumulative dairy farmer net
revenues. Past advertising allocation strategies have tended to
emphasize fluid milk because the minimum regulated price paid
to farmers is highest for milk used as a beverage. However,
because the component content, demand elasticities and predicted
growth rates of fluid milk and cheese differ and because they have
different impacts on the minimum regulated price formulae,
changes in the allocation of generic advertising expenditures
could increase dairy farmer net revenues. To explore this hypoth
esis, simulation runs using the Powell optimization algorithm in
Vensim® dynamic simulation software (Ventana Systems, 2005)
examine what step change in fluid milk advertising expenditures
from funds provided by dairy farmers would maximize
cumulative net revenues for dairy farmers. Because fluid milk
processors allocate check-off funds only to generic advertising of
fluid milk, assumed generic advertising expenditures by fluid
milk processors do not change from 2004 levels. Corresponding
changes in generic advertising expenditures for cheese and fluid
milk by dairy farmers keep overall expenditures on generic ad
vertising expenditures constant. The optimization exercise as
sumes a permanent, simultaneous step change in allocation of
generic advertising expenditures starting in January 2006. (Note
that this approach differs from optimization to determine the
optimal allocation of advertising expenditures across products

Table 2
Summary of simulation scenario results
Scenario

Baseline (with demand growth)
Base supply response
Less sensitive supply response

Cumulative
Average fluid Average
Average milk Cumulative
Cumulative
Cumulative
advertising
milk sales
cheese sales production
producer
producer net
net benefit
expenditures ($ mil) (mil lbs/mo) (mil lbs/mo) (bil lbs/mo) revenues ($ mil) revenues ($ mil) cost ratio 1
485.2
485.2

4776.0
4777.5

317.4
317.7

14.7
14.8

114,314.7
113,602.3

−3263.7
−3976.7

Change from Baseline
Increase Generic Advertising
Base supply response
Less sensitive supply response

+ 485.2
+ 485.2

109.0
107.3

4.6
4.2

0.2
0.1

3568.4
4408.8

1348.4
2178.3

2.8
4.5

Eliminate Generic Advertising
Base supply response
Less sensitive supply response

−485.2
− 485.2

− 215.5
− 216.2

−10.2
−10.2

− 0.4
− 0.2

−6084.3
−6691.3

−2195.9
−3319.9

4.5
6.8

− 67.5
− 67.3

6.9
6.7

0.1
0.1

2253.5
2549.3

897.1
1245.0

–3
–3

Optimal Product Allocation of Generic
Advertising
Base supply response
Less sensitive supply response

0.0 2
0.0 2

–
–

Note: All cumulative values represent the period January 2006 to December 2009.
1
The cumulative benefit cost ratio is defined as the change in cumulative producer net revenues (from the baseline) divided by the change in cumulative advertising
expenditures (from the baseline) at the end of model simulation time. This value is calculated for the reported scenarios, not as a change from the baseline scenario.
2
No overall change occurs in aggregate generic advertising expenditures. However, $2.3 million per month of the funds provided by dairy farmers is switched
from fluid milk to cheese advertising expenditures.
3
Not reported because no change occurs in cumulative advertising expenditures, only a reallocation among the two advertised products.

and over time, which may be addressed with future modifications
to the model.)
The optimization results indicate that dairy farmer net revenues
could be increased through a complete reallocation of fluid milk
advertising expenditures to cheese expenditures for funds pro
vided by dairy farmers (Table 2). A reduction of 100% in fluid
milk advertising expenditures by dairy farmers in expenditures on
fluid milk (from about $2.3 million per month) and an increase of
141% in cheese expenditures (from $1.7 million per month to
$4.1 million per month) maximizes dairy farmer net revenues.
The optimal allocation of advertising expenditures to the two
products is not at all sensitive to the responsiveness of average
animal lifetime. The optimal reallocation of expenditures results
in a reduction in fluid milk sales and an increase in cheese sales,
with behaviors similar to those observed for these products in
response to a decrease and increase in advertising expenditures,
respectively. Producer prices first increase, then decrease, then
increase again in response the reallocation, more so in the final
months of the simulation than as a part of the initial response.
These results indicate that the current level of generic advertising
expenditures could, if reallocated away from fluid milk and
towards cheese, increase cumulative dairy farmer net revenues by
27 to 31% compared to the baseline scenarios for the more and
less responsive scenarios, respectively. Thus, without increasing
expenditures by dairy farmers, reallocation of advertising to
cheese would increase net revenues by more than 50% of the
previously-reported increase generated by doubling advertising
expenditures (Table 2).
Why does this reallocation increase dairy farmer net revenues,
when raw milk sold for beverage use has the highest minimum

regulated price? Additional simulation analyses (not reported
herein) to control for various factors suggest four principal
reasons. First, fluid milk sold to consumers has a fat content less
than that of raw milk. To achieve this lower fat content, fluid milk
bottlers separate cream from the raw milk. This cream often ends
up used to manufacture butter. An increase in fluid milk sales
results in additional butter production and lower butter prices,
which has an offsetting effect on all of the other minimum pricing
formulae. Second, the assumed growth rate of demand for cheese
is 1.5% per year, whereas no growth is assumed for fluid milk
consumption. Increases in cheese sales due to generic advertising
thus generate increased growth in demand for milk over time.
The minimum price regulation formulae also have a key
impact. The minimum regulated price for raw milk used as a
beverage depends on the higher of (maximum) of the minimum
regulated prices for milk used in cheese or whey or in butter and
milk powder. In the 2004 base year, the minimum regulated price
for milk used in cheese is higher, and thus also determined the
minimum regulated price for fluid milk. An increase in generic
advertising expenditures on cheese and a reduction in expendi
tures on generic fluid milk advertising increases the cheese price
(as in Fig. 6), which increases the minimum regulated price for
both milk used in cheese and fluid milk. The relative price
elasticities of demand for fluid milk and cheese also influence this
outcome. An increase in generic advertising expenditures for
cheese will increase the price of fluid milk, but fluid milk sales
will decrease little because demand is highly inelastic. Con
versely, an increase in generic advertising of fluid milk will
increase cheese prices, but cheese sales will decrease to a greater
extent (ceteris paribus) because cheese demand is more elastic.

4. Conclusions and implications
Although numerous econometric evaluations of generic
dairy advertising exist, this study is the first to apply a stockflow-feedback systems model. This approach incorporates the
complexities of milk characteristics and economic regulations
of the US dairy industry. In particular, the model links milk
supply response, dairy economic regulations, and pricing of all
milk components to provide a more integrated and comprehen
sive analysis of generic advertising impacts on the industry.
The analysis reaffirms the findings of other authors that
generic dairy advertising is a highly profitable activity on the part
of dairy farmers and milk processors. Consideration of multiple
balancing feedback loop effects results in estimated cumulative
net benefit–cost ratios somewhat lower than previous estimates.
Furthermore, unlike previous research, the results include provide
detailed time paths of the response of important endogenous
variables to changes in generic fluid milk and cheese advertising.
One of the more relevant findings is the interaction between
changes in demand caused by advertising, milk supply response
and prices. Specifically, in the very short run, changes in adver
tising are positively associated with changes in prices. However,
over time, milk production responses significantly erode the price
impacts of advertising, as indicated by patterns in both prices and
net benefit cost ratios. Thus, the simplistic permanent step in
expenditures approach adopted for the scenarios above could be
refined to explore optimal inter-temporal allocation of advertising
expenditures.
The analysis of the optimal allocation of generic advertising
between fluid milk and cheese indicates that dairy farmers could
increase their net revenue by transferring all generic fluid milk
advertising expenditures into generic cheese advertising assum
ing fluid milk processors continue generic fluid advertising at
2004 levels. The broader implication is that generic advertising
efforts for dairy will be more effective if they increase demand
for all dairy components proportional to the composition of raw
milk. Nicholson and Stephenson (2006) find similar offsetting
effects for promotional efforts focused on milk proteins.
Many potential extensions of the model are possible, but three
are the most relevant. One useful extension would be to use the
current model to evaluate the optimality of other program ac
tivities such as other promotion programs, public relations, spon
sorship, and new product research. Funds from dairy farmers
support a variety of promotional purposes, including product
research and development and other forms of promotion in
addition to advertising. Funds from fluid milk processors promote
fluid milk only; dairy farmer funds promote dairy products and
dairy ingredients. Because money is invested by dairy farmers in
promotional activities other than generic advertising, an optimal
portfolio analysis would be of tremendous interest to policy
makers.
As noted above, the optimal allocation of both advertising
expenditures and other promotional activities over time could

be analyzed, and has the potential to improve cumulative dairy
farmer net revenues through reduction of the effects of the supply
response feedback loop (which increases milk supplies). Finally,
milk prices and supply response differ on a regional basis. Thus, a
more significant extension would be to develop a multi-regional
model that explicitly incorporates the regional pricing structure
and supply response differences. Such an extension would also
allow evaluating optimal advertising spending over geographic
markets.
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